Could the Deepwater Horizon disaster have been prevented? FRONTLINE and ProPublica team up to investigate the long and troubled history of the oil giant, BP.
(inaudible radio chatter)
>> Safety remains our number one priority.
>> BP can talk about safetyall they want,
but they're not going to becomea safer company.
>> They base everything on risk.
"How many lives can we afford to lose
before we need to dealwith this?"
>> Yes, this plant just blew up!
>> NARRATOR: From Texas and Alaska to the Gulf of Mexico...
>> BP apologized again...
>> NARRATOR: ...apology after apology.
>> They pledged repeatedlyto run a safer
operation, yet they continue to cut costs.
>> We have a facility here that could produce a cloud of
gas that would make this place look like Hiroshima.
>> NARRATOR: What went wrong at BP?
>> The culture of BP management has to change.
They refuse to change.
>> NARRATOR:Tonight on "Frontline",
correspondent Martin Smith joins forces with ProPublica
to investigate "The Spill."
>> The oil rig Deepwater Horizon exploded.
>> There was growing desperation
along the U.S. Gulf Coast today...
>> NARRATOR: It's been called the worst environmental
disaster in U.S. history...
>> 42,000 gallons of oil a day...
>> 210,000 gallons are leaking...
>> 2.1 million gallons a day...
>> NARRATOR: ...a geyser of oil
that caught the government off-guard...
>> No more oil spills! Arrest BP!
>> NARRATOR: ...and threw a spotlight on a company
that Americans knew little about.
>> In Washington today,
protesters calledf or the U.S. government
to get hostile with BP.
>> Mr. Hayward!
>> NARRATOR: When two months after the blowout,
BP's CEO Tony Hayward,came to Capitol Hill...
>> The testimony you are about to give to be the truth,
>> NARRATOR: ...he was there to explain what happened and why.
>> Begin your opening statement, and let me again, on behalf...
>> NARRATOR: From the start, it didn't go well.
>> Chairman Waxman, Chairman...
>> Tony Hayward, look at my hands.
This is what it looks like for the Plaquemines down there,
and I think you need to be charged with a crime!
You need to go to jail.
As a matter of fact, I've got some chains and I'll...
You need to be charged with a crime!
>> Can you tell us under oath
that the decision to use six centralizers instead of....
>> NARRATOR: Amidst the technical questions,
there were deeper concerns...
>> You're the CEO of the company.
>> With respect, sir, we drill hundreds of wells a year
all around the world.
>> Yeah, I know, that's what's scaring me right now.
>> NARRATOR: ...about whether this was a company
that could be trusted.
>> Mr. Hayward, when you became CEO three years ago,
you said that safety was goingto be your top priority...
>> NARRATOR: The interrogation produced few new answers.
>> One of the reasons that I am so distraught...
>> I don't want to know whether you're distraught.
>> NARRATOR: It was mostly political theater.
>> We're going to have a hard time reaching conclusions
if you stonewall them.
>> I'm not stonewalling.
>> NARRATOR: It was also not the first time
the company had been in trouble.
In London, the board has been in crisis mode
for much of the last five years.
They've encountered disasters on all fronts--
at their refineries, in their oil fields.
The blowout in the Gulfis just the latest.
>> This is a company that has brought us
the worst environmental disaster in U.S. history.
That's not an accident.
>> NARRATOR: Critics say BP has a very bad record.
It's a company that has grown too fast
and taken on too many risks.
This is a story about ambition and its consequences.
To investigate BP's corporate history,
we started here in Texas City,
the site of the company's largest
and one of its most troubled refineries.
>> Hi, Don.
My name is Abrahm Lustgarten.
I'm a reporter with ProPublica.
I'm calling you because I'm working on an in-depth piece
about the history of BP and its management culture.
>> NARRATOR: BP had an accident here in 2005
where 15 people died in an explosion and fire.
170 more were injured.
Afterwards, there were charges
that BP's management valued profits more than safety.
We came to the refinery hoping to talk to managers.
>> So this is all BP, right?
>> NARRATOR: BP declined.
>> And the explosion would have happened, then,
on the far side of all this big equipment.
>> NARRATOR: The 1,200-acre refinery was acquired by BP
in 1999 as partof a $61 billion takeover
of the American oil company Amoco.
But built in 1934, the refinery was in bad shape.
Workers and contractors were wary of the place.
>> The refinery was not in prime shape, put it that way.
Rotted-out columns, things that were rusted,
not protected from corrosion, fire hazards everywhere.
>> It was typical for them to experience a fire every
week, on average.
A fire every week is a warning sign
that something is critically wrong at the facility.
It was the worst refinery around this area, for sure.
>> NARRATOR: When the refinery was under Amoco's
management, major upgrades had been postponed.
For example, in 1991, Amoco considered replacing
its antiquated blowdown drums, used to collect volatile liquids
and gases in an emergency, with safer modern flares.
They decided against it.
>> A flare is more efficien and safer than a blowdown stack.
And there were several blowdown stacks within...
within the refinery that were old technology.
Long after a lot of other folks said,
"We're not using those anymore,"BP still was using them.
>> NARRATOR: It was a question of saving money.
These emails from 2002 reveal that BP had also
considered updating the blowdown drums.
"We need to decide if we want to invest $150,000 now
to save more money later on," wrote one employee.
A senior manager responded,
"capital expenditure is very tight."
Bank the $150,000 in savings now."
>> And at that point, BP culture was "Show me the money,"
and refining was not showing them the money.
>> You can only spend a penny once.
"Should we do it fixing up this refinery?"
You're choosing among priorities,
and they did not give this deferred maintenance priority
at Texas City refinery the attention, the priority,
it should have gotten.
>> NARRATOR: The pressure to cut costs
came from the very top of BP.
After the buy out of Amoco, Tony Hayward's predecessor,
Lord John Browne, ordered a 25% cost cut across the company.
The message was relayed down through the ranks.
>> I don't know if they realized just how devastating
the cost-cutting ethos was when it actually played out
in the field.
When there's a whisper at the top of the company,
it becomes like a shout at the bottom.
>> You were starting to hear a little bit more about,
"Make due with what you got and try to make it more efficient."
So you were taking older equipment and pushed it
to a hilt.
If something didn't blow up, it was a good day.
>> NARRATOR: In March 2004, there was a major fire.
Fortunately, it was in an unmanned part of the refinery.
Nobody was hurt, but problems continued.
Don Parus,a safety-conscious engineer,
took over the refinery a few months later
and was trying to turn things around.
>> Don was the refinery manager, or as locals liked to say,
he was the second mayor of the town.
The workforce tended to trust in him because, I think,
for the first time, they were having a refinery manager
who was harping a little bit more about safety.
>> NARRATOR: One of the first things Parus did was commission
an employee survey.
In it, workers talked about their
"exceptional degree of fear."
They worried about dying.
>> There was a fatality once,
approximately every 18 months or so.
The feeling of the workforce
was that there was an imminent catastrophic accident
that could happen in the near future.
>> NARRATOR: Parus alerted his boss in London, John Manzoni,
BP's chief of refining, about the severity of safety issues.
>> Don Parus had held several meetings with John Manzoni,
the head of refining.
In each, he expressed grave concerns
about the safety of working at the Texas City refinery.
>> NARRATOR: Parus even went to BP headquarters in London
and showed Manzonia PowerPoint presentation.
In it, a list of dead workers;
details on two recent fatal accidents;
a tally of more than 20 fatalities in 30 years.
>> The basic response Don Parus got was, "Well, that's your job
to make sure this stuff doesn't happen."
And he was pleading for, "Well, let me have the materials
to do my job that way."
London saw it a different way.
And that's part of that culture that BP didn't get.
>> We know we have to beat the others to win you over.
Can we do it?
>> You bet your BP we can!
>> NARRATOR: 20 years ago,
BP was nothing like the powerful multinational
corporation it is today.
The years of the once great Anglo-Persian oil company
were long past.
A revolution in Iran had crippled the company.
>> Among its peers, it was a company to be pitied
rather than emulated.
It had had to cut its dividends, its share price was at a low.
BP was in a very dark place in the late '80s, early '90s.
>> NARRATOR: It was then that a new group of managers came along
and attempted to rescue the company from mediocrity.
>> It was a good year for BP in very challenging times.
>> They had not found a way to replace the Iranian reserves.
They were not going to do so
remaining hierarchical and stuffy.
They had to get out there and they had to compete.
>> NARRATOR:A young engineer, John Browne,
was one of the new managers.
From early on, he had a reputation
as an aggressive cost cutter.
>> Jobs can be made wider,
without necessarily moving people.
>> NARRATOR: He was a math whiz, a numbers man,
and the board liked him.
In 1995, he was made CEO.
But he was a different kind of oilman.
>> In many ways, yes, he wasn't a Texas oilman,
but he was also not even a European oilman.
He had very refined tastes-- he enjoyed, obviously, fine wine,
and he enjoyed his cigars.
He was a very big opera-goer and opera buff.
>> NARRATOR: He never married and lived with his mother,
who often accompanied himto BP functions.
>> He doesn't have that larger-than-life J.R. Ewing
kind of thing going on at all,
but he was definitely willing to take big risks
and make big, big bets.
>> NARRATOR: Browne surrounded himself
with a small groupof executives,
including Bob Dudley, Tony Hayward, and John Manzoni,
known inside thecompany as his "turtles."
>> As in Ninja Turtles,
rising stars in the BP corporate structure
who he thought, one day,
had the ability or the potential to lead the company.
>> NARRATOR: Until then, Browne set the agenda.
It was Browne who took the company
on a gigantic buying spree.
>> John wanted to be the biggest.
He was competing with Mobil, competing with Exxon,
competing with Chevron.
And he was bound and determined to use mergers and acquisitions
as the lever to propel BP into the big leagues.
>> By merging our assets and our prospects
with those of Amoco...
>> NARRATOR: Browne began by purchasing Amoco.
>> If you put the two together,
you have a world-class set of complementary assets.
>> NARRATOR: Then, quickly, Browne would buy
six other companies,
including Arco, with its large Alaskan holdings.
>> Putting the two companies together...
>> NARRATOR: In just five years,
he quadrupled the company's value.
>> We'll be the largest producer of oil in the non-OPEC world.
>> It's a remarkable feat.
Almost overnight, BP became a world player.
>> Time to go beyond.
>> They went from a struggling also-ran into a company
that was fast on the heels of Exxon,
the largest company in the world.
>> The people of BP believe it's time to go beyond
what the world expects from an energy company.
>> NARRATOR: But by the end of his buying spree,
Browne was under pressure both to cut costs
and to reinvent his company.
>> One of the problems with building a company up in bits...
>> NARRATOR: Browne spoke of the challenge
at this management retreat in 2003.
>> Here's the practical, real danger--
a complex organization cannot be specified in rules.
>> Growth creates challenges to management.
There's no question about that.
I've worked with small companies,
I've worked with big companies.
Big companies are harder to manage.
>> So Enron melted down,
Worldcom had an accounting scandal,
Adelphia, you know, the CEO has gone to jail, I think.
>> BP, in this case, just grows beyond its management ability
to watch everything they need to watch
when they need to watch it.
>> Delegation, of course, comes with limits.
>> Browne has shown himself as having an ability
to get deals done, understanding how to negotiate complex deals.
>> It's about integration, too, and I'll come back to that.
>> But while they were successful
in expanding commercially,
they were less successful in instituting
a sense of operational excellence
within the organization.
>> You must be very clear as a leader
who it is you are delegating authority to.
>> NARRATOR: In an interview that year, Browne acknowledged
that the real measure of his new company lay ahead.
>> And the real quality of a company is, of course,
the test on how well things are going when things go well,
but the real test is, how do we respond when things go wrong?
>> NARRATOR: Things went wrong on March 23, 2005,
as workers at the Texas City plant were starting up
the isomerization unit.
The ISOM unit, used to boost the octane level of gasoline,
had been down for maintenance, a so-called turn around.
>> The most dangerous time of a refinery unit
is when it's being started up,
and when it's being decommissioned
and taking the product out of it and turning it off, so to speak.
>> NARRATOR: Dave Senko, a supervisor
with Jacobs Engineering, a BP contractor,
was off site at the time, but his team,
unaware of any danger, had gathered inside a trailer
near the adjacent ISOM unit.
>> We were not told that that unit was in a turnaround mode.
None of my people were aware.
>> We were never told.
We have a morning meeting before we start the day...
>> NARRATOR: Dave Leining of BP was meeting with Senko's team.
He was also unaware of the startup.
>> Nobody said a word to us about the ISOM starting up.
>> NARRATOR: By midday, workers had unknowingly overfilled
the ISOM tower with flammable liquids.
>> The tower steadily filled with liquid,
more than 15 times the normal level.
>> NARRATOR: A gauge that was supposed to measure
the amount of liquid in the tower failed.
Some alarms that should have sounded didn't.
Other alarms were simply ignored.
In an emergency, excess gas and liquid can be rerouted
to the blowdown drum, but there was too much.
>> As flammable hydrocarbons overfilled the blowdown drum,
operators nearby saw a geyser of liquid and vapor erupt
from the top of the stack.
>> NARRATOR: The antiquated blowdown drum had no flare
to handle the emergency.
>> The actual flammable liquidis flying out the top
of this thing like Old Faithful.
>> The trailer started shaking real violent.
And as I got up and turned sideways,
that's when the explosion happened.
And then, just the force of the blast
knocked me down to the ground,
and then you could see a big ball of fire
just roll over our heads, right over the trailer.
It just got real quiet.
It got real dark.
I figured, you know,"That's... that's the end."
>> A plant just blew up.
Oh, my God.
>> Texas City 9-1-1, state your emergency.
>> Yes. This plant just blew up.
>> It's the ISOM, the ISOM!
>> NARRATOR: It was the biggest industrial accident in decades.
>> Get me at least a half dozen available firemen.
We got people trapped in this trailer
trying to get to them.
>> It's been a sad day for the BP Texas City.
It's a really sad day for me, personally, as well.
At this time, regretfully and with shock,
I have to report to you
that there have been some fatalities.
>> Mr. Browne has spent the morning visiting our site.
He's now agreed to spend a few minutes with you.
This is John Browne, our group chief executive.
>> Thank you.
Ladies and gentlemen, good morning and thank you
for joining us.
Yesterday was a dark day in BP's history.
All of us at BP are very deeply saddened by the loss of life
and injuries suffered by so many people.
>> NARRATOR: Lawsuits ensued.
>> My name is John Manzoni.
I live in London and I'm with BP and my...
>> NARRATOR: In a taped deposition, John Manzoni,
head of refining, was asked about his visits to Texas City.
>> When was the first time you learned
there were serious safety concerns
at BP Texas City?
>> NARRATOR: Manzoni claimed he'd never been made aware
of serious safety issues at the plant.
>> The 23rd of March 2005.
>> Before that, you had no idea that there was a risk
of catastrophic injury?
I think had I been aware that we could have had
a catastrophic failure, we would have taken action earlier.
>> When Mr. Manzoni was asked directly,
"Were you aware of all of the multiple safety concerns
being raised?", his response was "No."
And I just... I couldn't believe that was true.
>> NARRATOR: Manzoni also denied
knowing about the cost-cutting in Texas City.
>> After the merger, there was apparently a decision
made to advise the various business unit leaders
at the various refineries to cut their fixed operational budgets
Do you know anything about that?
>> No, not specifically.
I don't know when that was.
>> NARRATOR: Eventually, BP paid victims and their families
over a billion dollars in exchange
for their agreeing never publicly to criticize
Everyone signed except for this woman, Eva Rowe,
who lost both her mother and father.
>> BP wanted to meet and talk about a settlement.
In my mind, I was thinking,
"You people are crazy that I'm just going to sign this
"and go away, and you guys are going to get away
with what you've done."
>> What did you say to them?
>> I specifically told them that that sucks.
This was not an accident.
This was profits over people.
I mean, they were, like, small repairs
that would've cost their company like $100,000 for, like,
a flare system.
That would've prevented the explosion also,
and they didn't do that.
>> NARRATOR: Rowe says that BP did not get in touch
with her until a month after the blast,
when they sent her $25,000 and this letter.
>> I got a form letter.
"Dear Ms. Rowe, we're sorry for the loss of your father,
>> NARRATOR: But it was the only letter she received.
>> I never received one that apologized
for the loss of my mother.
So, it was kind of upsetting.
>> NARRATOR: A year and a half after the accident,
BP finally settled with Rowe for an undisclosed amount of money
and $32 million in donations to charities of her choice.
She also insisted that BP be forced to release
seven million internal documents.
>> That's all I wanted in the first place,
was for the world to able to have the information from BP
on what happened there.
>> NARRATOR: Those documents contributed substantially
to government investigations
into what happened at Texas City.
Another investigation, commissioned by BP,
was led by former Secretary of State James Baker.
>> BP is going to approach process safety....
>> NARRATOR: The reports concurred.
>> BP has not adequately established process safety
as a core value.
>> NARRATOR: At the end of Baker's press conference,
Browne apologized via satellite from London.
>> BP gets it, and I get it, too.
This has happened on my watch, and as chief executive,
I have a responsibility to learn from what has occurred.
>> NARRATOR: $71 millionin federal fines were paid,
but no BP official was ever charged with a crime.
>> What bothers me most is that here we are,
five plus years after that blast,
and not a single person has been blamed
for the incident or the conditions that caused it.
>> NARRATOR: Today, the refinery continues to be
one of BP's most troubled and dangerous.
Four people have died here since the 2005 accident.
And in June 2010, T.J. Aulds of the GalvestonDaily News
reported that BP Texas City released toxic gases
over a 40-day period this last spring.
It resulted in more than half a million pounds of pollution.
BP reported the release to regulators.
The EPA is investigating.
>> It's their history.
Bad things have happened everywhere BP operates.
Everywhere they operate, something bad happens.
>> BP is in crisis mode after severe pipeline corrosion
forced the company...
>> The conditions at the spill site: nothing less than brutal.
>> ...calls now for investigative hearings
into why the company had to shut down...
>> NARRATOR: A year after the explosion in Texas City,
there were problemson another front: Alaska.
This is BP's giant Prudhoe Bay oil field
on Alaska's North Slope.
It represents 8% of America's domestic oil production.
But opened more than 30 years ago,
inadequate or deferred maintenance here, too,
has workers worried.
>> The pipelines are rusted where insulation has fallen off.
>> NARRATOR: Managers won't talk,
but workers like Marc Kovac, protected by their union,
explained how, back in the '60s,
everyone thought the field would last 20 years.
They were wrong.
>> All of the modules were designed in 1966
and put in place in the '70s.
And the expected life span of the field
and that equipment was designed to last till 1987,
and then it was supposed to be pulled out.
After they started drilling,
they knew that the pay zone was a lot deeper,
but we're still using a lot of the infrastructure
that was supposed to be pulled out in '87.
They're going to run everything to failure,
which means that everything here is going to be
worn out completely by the time they decide to leave.
>> There is so much money here and still so much oil to be made
that they're kind ofin the quandary
of having all this aging infrastructure,
but they have to stay here to make the big money
that they're making off of here.
>> NARRATOR:As in Texas City,
the workers say BP has focused on cost cutting.
>> When I was doing reporting on Alaska,
that's when I really began to hear about
this incredible focus on cost cuts
and that there was just tremendous pressure.
It was just shocking to me
that a company would be flying so close to the edge
on something, you know, where the downside is so huge.
>> NARRATOR: BP employs nearly 300 contractors
to inspect the pipes and wells, but it's a huge challenge.
>> Okay, you are set.
>> Our plan would say, "This line, this line, and this line,
you're going to do five inspections on it this year."
And it might be miles and miles long.
And it's kind of like a crap shoot, as far as,
are you going to find some damage or not?
We're inspecting as much as we have time to inspect,
but BP's... they base everything on the risk.
You know, "What's the risk?
"How far can we go with this
before we're going to lose a life?"
Or, "How many lives can we afford to lose
before we need to deal with this?"
>> NARRATOR: In 2002, oil worker Don Shugak was about to inspect
>> He did not know and was not told
that that well had a leak and had a problem.
The well blew up.
He was smashed against his truck,
and he had broken bones and was burned.
>> NARRATOR: Don Shugak layin a coma for six weeks.
These pictures were taken after he awoke.
He settled with BP for an undisclosed sum.
In exchange, he agreed not to speak to the media.
>> It's essentially a gag order.
There are many people who would say that BP devotes more effort
and attention to making that a priority than they do
to keeping their facilities safe in the first place.
>> NARRATOR: But far from quieting concerns,
Shugak's accident spurred workers once again
to bring safety problems to the attention of management.
>> And we would send a letter to London.
Normally, we get a nice answer back but no action.
>> Information had been brought forward
by the corrosion technicians and other employees to management,
had been summarily ignored,
people had been told to shut up about it,
and the potential for a corrosion-related rupture
And, lo and behold, in March of '06, it proved to be true.
>> NARRATOR: In March 2006, 260,000 gallons of oil
leaked from a pipeline.
It was the worst spill ever on the North Slope.
>> We told management there was going to be spills
and that these lines were going to break.
And we had a lake of oil out there
that was over three foot-deep
and rippling in 40-below weather.
>> 200,000 gallons is nothing to be sneezed at.
However, being that it was wintertime,
it made the response possible to basically get most, if not all,
of the hydrocarbons up out of the environment.
Had it been mid-summer and the sheet flow of water
across the North Slope and into the Beaufort Sea,
200,000 gallons would have been an environmental,
>> As it turned out, they weren't doing enough of
what they call pigging, which is putting through a metal thing--
they call it a pig-- that clears the sediment from the pipes.
This was an actual cost cut.
They figured they didn't need to do it as often
and they'd be just fine.
>> We had not pigged and cleaned the line for a long, long time.
>> NARRATOR: The pipe had notbeen pigged for nearly a decade.
BP managers had concluded that pigging wasn't necessary.
>> Several years previous to this, they had wanted to do away
with the pigging crew entirely in union negotiations.
They didn't want them.
They wanted to lay them off.
>> What, not pig at all?
They actually made that proposal across the bargaining table.
And we said, "Absolutely not."
>> NARRATOR: Five months after the spill,
Lord Browne arrived to personally inspect
He was assured by his chief corrosion expert
that the leak was an isolated incident.
>> The other lines that we still have in operation today
aren't showing this problem at all,
so we believe right now that the problem was located
to this specific segment of the line.
>> This is the only time that something has happened,
but one... one time is too many.
>> NARRATOR: Two days later, there was another spill.
>> BP is in crisis mode after severe pipeline corrosion
forced the company to shut downits Prudhoe Bay field in Alaska.
>> NARRATOR: BP was forced to shut down its operations.
It caused a major disruptionin oil supplies,
and in the lower 48, a spike in prices at the pump.
>> BP apologized again this morning for their failure
to keep the crucial commodity flowing.
>> NARRATOR: In the wake of the shutdown,
a senior BP official was reassigned.
>> Is the pipeline corrosion in Alaska just the latest example
of bad luck for the company,
or are there serious management issues for BP?
>> NARRATOR: Meanwhile, the subcontractor responsible
for pipe inspections, Acuren, had hired a new supervisor.
>> Welcome to BP's Prudhoe Bay operations.
>> NARRATOR: His name was Martin Anderson.
>> My name is Marty Anderson.
I'm the quality assurance and radiation...
I had received a phone call from North Slope project manager
with Acuren at the time who was responsible
for providing nondestructive testing
for the corrosion inspection chemicals group for BP.
He asked me if I'd be interested in a supervisor's position.
>> What do you begin to find?
What do you uncover?
>> As you know, I'm not at liberty to discuss
too many details.
>> You're saying you can't talk freely
because you signed a nondisclosure agreement?
>> That's correct.
>> NARRATOR: Anderson can't say anything
that criticizes the company...
>> I'm not at liberty to...
>> NARRATOR: ...and has never spoken to the media before.
But independently, ProPublica and Frontline have learned
that some pipe inspectors were not certified
or trained properly.
>> I've shown you this letter, this e-mail, previously,
and you had a chance to look through that and read it, right?
>> NARRATOR: Anderson's findings are cited in this email
sent to BP officials from an attorney who deals
with worker complaints.
The concerns are described as "serious,"
revealing a "significant quality control breakdown"
with "inspectors in the field performing inspections
for which they were not qualified."
>> Is there anything in there that is inaccurate?
>> No, that's a very factual document.
>> You found that inspectors were unqualified?
>> Yes, everything in that letter is factual.
>> Have you ever suspected
that what you were seeing was actually intentional
and therefore criminal?
>> I've had concerns.
Not being an attorney, knowing what is breaking the law
and what is not breaking the law,
but I can tell you that I was very uncomfortable
with the situationthat they had.
>> NARRATOR: BP has since acknowledged
that more than 19 inspectors,
responsible for 13,000 inspection points,
They say they've corrected the problem
and that at least 10,000 inspection points
have been re-examined.
By 2006, BP's most promising oil fields
were here in the Gulf of Mexico.
They had bet their future on it.
>> If you want to continue to grow as an oil company,
you have to keep extracting more oil.
So, deepwater was the next frontier.
>> NARRATOR: The U.S. government,
worried about dependence on Middle East oil, encouraged it.
>> They wanted the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico
to be explored,
and BP was the kid in the front of the class
putting up its hand before it even had an answer, basically.
They like to be pushing into ever-deeper territory.
It's how you get kudos in the industry,
and it's hugely impressive, what they were doing.
>> They were very confident.
They actually believed they were going to overtake Exxon
in terms of production.
They'd found a lot of oil in the Gulf
and they were feeling on top of the world.
>> NARRATOR: BP is the leading operator here,
producing 25% of all Gulf oil
from some of the deepest waters in the world.
>> In fact, it was BP who had found the deepest ever,
so everybody was actually pretty excited about this
and people were just losing sight of the risks.
>> The deep Gulf was regarded as a very difficult place to drill.
Storms, hurricanes, just putting a deep well
down through a lot of water.
It's geologically a difficult place in which to operate.
>> NARRATOR: Thunder Horse,
which towers 43 stories above water,
was BP's showcase platform--
a symbol of the oil giant's ability to innovate,
to push technology to the limit.
But in July 2005,
Hurricane Dennis swirled over the Gulf of Mexico.
The rig's celebrity would be short lived.
Thunder Horse toppled over.
>> This was a state-of-the-art rig
which had cost BP billions of dollars to design and build,
and it looked like it was going to sink.
It was very embarrassing.
>> NARRATOR: After an investigation,
BP discovered that the storm wasn't the problem.
>> That, in itself, shouldn't have been disastrous.
It turns out that BP engineers had incorrectly installed
a number of valves that are meant to control the flow
of water in the supports that keep the rig afloat.
And the rig, as a result, took on water instead of shedding it.
>> NARRATOR: A senior engineer on the Thunder Horse project
agrees it was human error.
>> The storm is not really the cause of why that thing
It's because the check valve was installed backwards, okay?
And all that was probably caused by being in a hurry
and not dotting their Is and crossing their Ts, in this case.
>> NARRATOR: The platform became one more big black eye for BP.
>> You had Texas City, you had Alaska,
you had the problems at Thunder Horse.
I think the first one or two incidents,
people were able to say,
"Well, you know, everybody's had these accidents."
But after a while, so many things mount up
that you've got to wonder,
"Is there a deeper systemic problem?"
>> NARRATOR: Back in London,
BP's board had seen enough of Browne.
>> He had Texas City; he had the leak at the pipeline.
These were a series of closely spaced accidents
which caused the board to lose confidence in John.
And then, the embarrassment of his personal life.
That was the end.
>> Lie over gay partner ends BP chief's career.
>> The surprise resignation of Lord John Browne.
>> NARRATOR: A newspaper had pursued a story
of Browne's private life.
While trying to contain the scandal,
Browne lied to a judge about how he met his gay partner.
Browne's departure was expedited.
The board had already been considering
three of his top turtles to replace him.
Two of them had strikes against them.
Bob Dudley, then head of a big BP venture in Russia,
was viewed as an outsider.
>> He is the only guy who was actually a possible candidate
to succeed John Browne who had run a company,
but he came from Amoco.
He's an American.
>> NARRATOR: And then there was John Manzoni,
who had been groomed to take over,
but he was marked by the accident at Texas City.
That left Tony Hayward,
an engineer who had headed oil exploration worldwide.
He took over in 2007.
>> Tony Hayward was well regarded-- BP guy, engineer,
extremely capable, an oilman through and through,
and someone to consider a very worthy successor for John.
>> I guess I should start by saying
this has been one hell of a year.
I mean, it really has.
It started with a tsunami.
It continued with Texas City...
>> NARRATOR:When Hayward took over,
he spoke candidly about BP's problems.
>> We then nearly sunk our flagship project
in the deepwater Gulf of Mexico.
And I think the only good thingI would say about all of this
is, A, it's good to have it all behind you.
>> The message he was sending was not only
that things had been bad,
but that he was splitting away from John Browne.
>> This is about a fundamental lack of leadership
and management in the area of safety, period.
>> Tony Hayward came into BP's CEO role on a mission
to fix the problems that the company had.
In his view, he thought that Browne had been too aloof
and too focused on growing the company
and had lost sight of what it took to mine those resources.
>> We had a major, major oil spill in Alaska.
>> NARRATOR: Hayward gave this blunt analysis
of what had gone wrong at BP to a group of business students
at Stanford University.
>> We diagnosed the following-- a company that was too top down,
too directive, and not good at listening.
We had too many people that were working to save the world.
We'd sort of lost track of the fact that our primary purpose
in life is to create value for our shareholders,
and we failed to recognize we're an operating company.
We had too many people that did not understand
what it took to run operations.
We had too many shallow generalists.
>> NARRATOR: Hayward set out to refocus BP.
He allocated $14 billion to upgrade operations,
and established a new safety group.
The changes were well received internally.
>> BP folks had been through the wringer.
They had not felt proud of the company they worked for,
and I think, in general, they sighed a great sigh of relief
when a new management came in.
>> NARRATOR: But London's bankers weren't happy.
BP's stock price was slumping.
Hayward came under renewed pressure to keep cutting costs.
>> Now BP has announced a bid to cut costs,
boost revenues and improve the oil giant's
>> It just doesn't make sense.
It's not clear how the company can continue
to shave its expenses while supposedly reinvesting
in the procedures and the equipment
and the operations that have placed it at such great risk
over so many years.
>> Safety remains our number one priority,
and I'm pleased to report we can see clear progress.
>> NARRATOR: But if Hayward was going to reform
BP's safety culture,
he would be doing it while taking bigger and bigger risks
in deeper and deeper water.
By 2010, BP had over 100 wells in the Gulf under rigs
like the Atlantis, Mad Dog, and the Deepwater Horizon.
>> The U.S. government made it very easy and very attractive
for them to move quickly.
>> NARRATOR: And they were encouraged
with generous subsidies and limited penalties
if something went wrong.
>> For example, their liability cap, if there was a spill,
was $75 million,
which is basically five cents to you and me.
So, why would you go drill somewhere else where,
politically, it's more difficult,
and perhaps the geology isn't as great
and your liability is going to be really high?
It made sense for BP to be there.
>> Today, we're announcing the expansion of off shore oil
and gas exploration.
>> NARRATOR: As the Deepwater Horizon was drilling
the Macondo well,
President Obama announced a major expansion
of offshore drilling.
>> There will be those who strongly disagree
with this decision.
>> NARRATOR: He delivered his speech at Andrews Air Force Base
to underscore that oil was an urgent strategic issue.
BP could only be pleased.
>> Clearly, the company that will do most of that drilling
in the Gulf of Mexico is BP.
They own the vast majority of the leases
for new and promising areas that would be explored.
Yet, at exactly the same time,
multiple agencies in the Obama administration
are actively investigating BP on several fronts.
>> NARRATOR: At the EPA, lawyers representing several agencies,
including the Departments of Interior and Defense,
were considering disqualifying BP
from getting any more government contracts.
At the Department of Labor,
attorneys were evaluating a series of ongoing violations
at several BP refineries, and at the Chemical Safety Board,
investigators were demanding that BP act on promises
made in 2005 to address safety issues in Texas City.
But in the White House, Carol Browner,
Obama's chief environmental advisor, said that,
in the policy discussions over drilling,
BP's safety record never came up.
They relied instead on the industry's
overall 30-year offshore drilling record.
>> If you have a 30-year record, that speaks volumes.
I think most of us, if making decisions in our own lives,
had 30 years of information that suggested something was safe,
we would pay attention to that.
>> But at what point does the safety and environmental record
of a company rise to an issue of concern for you
in the White House?
>> The White Houseis not involved
in individual leasing decisions or permitting decisions.
Those are handled, you know, outside of the political system,
and appropriately so.
They're factual decisions made by the Department of Interior.
That's their responsibility.
It's not part of the broader policy decision, which is,
"Should we enhance and increase the amount
of domestic oil production?"
>> NARRATOR: At Interior,
Secretary Ken Salazar's chief deputy is David Hayes.
But here, too, BP's track recordfailed to alarm anyone.
>> Would an application from BP receive any special attention,
given BP's troubled track record?
>> I don't believe so.
The track record for BP as a company,
in terms of deepwater performance,
I'm not aware that BP would be singled out
for special attention.
>> The Thunder Horse rig-- almost completely destroyed.
They had the Texas City disaster,
they had the problems on the North Slope of Alaska.
At what point does the company performance
start to raise red flags?
>> The enforcement philosophy that we have
and the permitting philosophy that we have,
is we expect every applicant to come in
and provide the demonstration required to show
that they can do the activities they're being requested to do.
We expect our permit reviewers and our enforcers
to be tough on everybody.
>> NARRATOR:That would mean lawyers
at the Departmentof the Interior, the EPA
or the Justice Department,
but former chief of the Environmental Crimes section
at Justice, David Ulhmann, says that the laws have no teeth.
>> How do you explain that acompany with an egregious record
is allowed to participate
in the most challenging kind of drilling
in a sensitive environment?
>> That's a great question, and the answer is that our laws
don't today createany barriers,
any limits on their ability to continue operating.
As soon as they've cleaned up whatever mess they've made,
they're off the hook.
>> And if you'rea repeat offender?
>> The law's no different.
>> The law's no different?
So, you can get another contract, you can drill again,
you can operate a refinery?
>> That's correct.
>> Simple as that?
>> Simple as that.
(indistinct voiceover radio)
>> Time, 21:03:15 Greenwich Mean Time,
the Deepwater Horizon on fire.
>> NARRATOR:The explosion came just 20 days
after Obama's speech at Andrews Air Force Base.
11 workers killed, 17 more injured.
Things had gone wrong here from the beginning.
A worker had called the project a "nightmare,"
the "well from hell."
Internal documents show that BP engineers were debating
how to cut costs on a project
that was already way over budget.
>> Every indication was that the well that blew out,
it was already $10 million over,
and to get caught doing a remedial cement job
and going back in there and doing all this work
was another $10 million.
And that was going to impact them,
so they were cutting corners on an operation side
trying to get by with less.
>> NARRATOR: BP by passed a keytest called a cement bond log.
BP saved more than $100,000.
BP cut the number of centralizers
used to secure and plug the well.
This saved over a million.
BP also chose to remove heavy drilling mud
that was helping to keep gas underground
instead replacing it with lighter sea water,
saving millions more.
>> Please rise and raise your right hands.
>> NARRATOR: And in a Congressional hearing
after the spill,
executives of four of the world's largest oil companies
all testified that, in the case of Deepwater,
BP did not operate to industry standards.
>> I sent a letter toTony Hayward, the CEO of BP,
and the letter describes a series of decisions that BP made
that seemed to increase the risk of catastrophic blowout.
I'd like to ask each of you
whether you think mistakes were made by BP.
>> Well, in reviewing the letter that you sent,
it appears clear to me
that a number of design standards were...
that I would consider to be the industry norm were not followed.
>> It's not a well that we would have drilled
with that mechanical setup, and there are operational concerns.
>> Not all standards that we would recommend
or that we would employ were in place.
>> NARRATOR: Two days later, Tony Hayward was summoned.
>> Mr. Hayward, we had a hearing earlier this week
with CEOs from the other oil companies.
They were unanimous in their view
that you made risky decisions
that their companies would not have made.
And the conclusion that I draw
is that BP used a more dangerous well design to save $7 million.
Don't you feel any sense of responsibility
for these decisions?
>> In the three years thatI've been CEO,
I've focused on improving dramatically
our safety and environmental performance.
Prior to this accident, that has indeed been the case,
and that is why, amongst all the other reasons,
I am so devastated by this accident.
>> His testimony before the Congress on Macondo well
was really embarrassing.
>> I'm not a cement engineer, I'm afraid.
>> "I didn't know anything about the centering,
I'm not a cementing expert."
That was really...
>> He said he wasn't part of the decision-making process.
You're supposed to know.
>> NARRATOR: In the weeks and months following the spill,
BP's board lost faith in Tony Hayward.
He was replaced with Bob Dudley.
Dudley would be the third CEO in four years.
>> No questions guys, please.
No questions at all, please.
>> NARRATOR: For months, we asked BP to grant an interview.
>> What are the changes going to be?
>> Well, there's no question we're going to learn a lot
from this accident in the Gulf Coast.
>> NARRATOR: They agreed to consider written questions.
We sent more than 40.
They gave us a three-paragraph response.
In it, they pledged to restructure and improve safety
in all their operations.
>> Several oil executives that I spoke with
described this process of reforming a company culture
as a monumental task.
>> Tony and I are going to work through a transition
between now and....
>> And it's something that will occupy a chief executive's focus
and attention every single day, every day of the week,
every week of the year,in perpetuity.
>> Thanks ever so much.
>> Thank you.
>> Thank you.
>> Thank you, all.
>> NARRATOR: BP now faces the largest liabilities
in corporate history.
In July 2010, a bill passed the House of Representatives
that would ban BP from drilling new deepwater wells
for seven years.
The bill is pending in the Senate.
In Texas City, the Department of Labor just levied $50 million
in new fines for BP's failure to address safety issues
they had promised to correct after the 2005 explosion.
And in Alaska, maintenance documents from October 2010
show that the pipelines here remain seriously corroded.
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